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614 DAKTT~LS 1J. CI'rY & CouN'rY OF SAN FRANCISCO r 40 C.2c1 
L8. 1<'. No. 18701. Jn Bank. Apr. 9, 1953.J 
LAURA E. DA.NIEI.,S et al., Appellants, v. CITY AND 
COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO et al., Respondents. 
[1] Negligence-Last Clear Chance.-Whether or not the doctrine 
of last clear chance applies in a particular case depends en-
tirely on existence or nonexistence of elements necessary to 
bring· it into play, and such question is controlled by factual 
circumstances and must ordinarily be resolved by the fact-
finder. 
[2] !d.-Instructions-Last Clear Chance.-An instructicn stating 
the last clear chance doctrine is proper when there is evi-
dence showing that plaintiff's negligence had placed him in 
a position of danger from which he could not escape by the 
exercise of ordinary care, and defendant had knowledge of 
plaintiff's situation and had last clear chance to avoid the 
accident by exercising ordinary care, but defendant failed 
to exercise such care and the accident resulted which caused 
plaintiff's injuries. 
[3a-3c] Automobiles-Evidence-Last Clear Chance.-In action for 
injuries resulting from an intersection collision of defendant's 
bus with automobile driven by plaintiff, it cannot be said as 
a matter of law that the evidence is insufficient to justify 
application of last clear chance doctrine where there is evi-
dPnce that plaintiff did not stop at an arterial stop sign be-
fore entering a six-lane highway, and came to a complete stop 
only as she was crossing the highway's eastbound middle lane, 
at which point Rhe first became aware of defendant's bus 
traveling toward her in the inner eastbound lane and accele-
rated her car in an effort to escape from path of bus; that bus 
driver saw plaintifi's car when it proceeded into highway, and 
that he saw it "slowing up" until it came to a complete stop 
directly in his path; that plaintiff and her guest first saw the 
bus when it was 200 feet away and traveling in the middle 
eastbound lane between 30 and 60 miles per hour, and that bus 
[1 J Doc tine of last clear chance, notes, 92 A.L.R. 47; 119 A.L.R. 
1041; 171 A.L.R. 365. See, also, Cal.Jur., Negligence, § 80; Am. 
Jur., Negligence, § 215. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Negligence, § 46; [2] Negligence, 
§ 217; [3] Automobiles, § 271; [4, 7] Automobiles, § 305; [5, 6] 
Automobiles, § 152; [8, 9] Automobiles, § 352; [10] Trial, § 154; 
[11] Appeal and Error, § 1714; [12] Appeal and Error, § 1471; 
[13] Automobiles, § 275; [14] Automobiles, § 322-1; [15] Wit-
nesses, § 93 ( 4); [16] Automobiles, § 350-1. 
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dl'iver suddenly swung bus into inner lane when plaintiff's car 
was but 50 feet ahead. 
[ 4] !d.-Province of Court and Jury-Last Clear Chance.-Where 
automobile driven by plaintiff entered highway on which de-
fPndant's bus was proceeding and slowed to a full stop in the 
middle lane directly in the path of the approaching bus, it 
is a .factual consideration for the jury whether or not such 
procedure was sufficient to alert a reasonable man. 
[5] Id.--Last Clear Chance.-Applic:ability of last clear chance 
doetTine to a vehicle collision case is not limited to where 
defendant actually knew that an accident was inevitable if 
he failed to exercise ordinary caTe, it being sufllcient if cir-
cumstances of which he had knowledge were such as to convey 
to the mind of a reasonably prudent person a question as to 
whether plaintiff would be able to escape a collision. 
[6] Id.-Last Clear Chance.-If defendant bus driver saw auto-
mobile driven by plaintiff enter highway on which bus was 
proceeding and slow to a full stop in the middle lane directly 
in the path of the bus, defendant may not avoid application 
of last clear chance doctrine by asserting that plaintiff's auto-
mobile was not in a position of danger until it jumped for-
ward from a standing position in the middle lane into the 
path of the bus as its driver veered to the inside lane in 
an attempt to avoid a collision. 
[7] !d.-Province of Court and Jury--Last Clear Chance.-Where 
plaintiff suing for injuries resulting from an intersection col-
lision of an automobile driven by her and defendant's bus 
testi {iPd that she first saw tlw bus approaching in the six-lane 
high way's east hound middle laue, estimating its speed at he-
twePn 50 and 60 miles per hour, and that without any warning 
OJ' signal of any kind to indicate an intent to change his course, 
the bus driver suddenly swung into the inner lane as plaintiff's 
car was but 50 feet ahead, resulting in the collision, whereas 
defendant argued that plaintiff, having admittedly entered 
the highway at the slow rate of 5 miles per hour, had the 
better chance to a void the accident, and that having come to 
a stop in the middle lane, she could have remained there 
in a "place of safety" until the bus passed in front of her 
ear via the inner lane, and that he could not anticipate that 
she would "jump" her automobile ahead into the inner lane 
when it was not possible for the bus to stop in time to avoid 
a collision, it is ::1 question for the jury to determine whether 
bus driver had a last clear ehanee to avoid tlw accident by 
exercising ordinary care. 
[8] !d.-Instructions-Last Clear Chance.-In action for injuries 
resulting from an intersection collision of defendant's bus 
with automobile driven by plaintiff, instructions directed only 
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to duty of bus driver to "use reasonable prudence in analyzing 
the ... situation" confronting him so as to avoid colliding 
with the automobile do not include the elements of the last 
clear chance doctrine. 
[9] !d.-Instructions-Last Clear Chance.-Instructions in vehicle 
collision case that any negligence on the part of plaintiff driver 
or her guest would bar a recovery refute any application of 
the last clear chance doctrine, since a necessary tenet of such 
doctrine is the presence of plaintiff's negligence. 
[10] Trial-Instructions-Theory of Case.-It is the duty of the 
court to instruct on every theory of the case finding support 
in the evidence. 
[11] Appeal-Harmless and Reversible Error-Verdict.-The or-
dinary rules on appeal sustaining a general verdict which the 
evidence on one of several issues upholds have no application 
where plaintiffs' theory of recovery was not even presented 
to the jury as an issue affecting their right of recovery. 
[12] !d.-Harmless and Reversible Error-Miscarriage of Justice. 
-If it cannot be said that, in the absence of error complained 
of, a different verdict would have been improbable, the er-
roneous ruling constitutes a miscarriage of justice within the 
meaning of Const., art. VI, § 4Yz. 
[13] Automobiles-Province of Court and Jury-Speed.-Whether 
a given area of a highway is a residence district with a 25-
mile limit (Veh. Code, § 511) is not a jury question, since 
signposting is the sole criterion in view of the fact that the 
code provision expressly pr,escribes a 55-mile limit "under all 
conditions unless a different speed is established ... and signs 
are in place giving notice thereof." 
[14] Id.-Instructions-Speed.-It is not error to instruct that 
tl,le prima facie speed limit at the area of the highway where 
a collision of vehicles occurred was 55 miles per hour, in 
the absence of evidence that signposting established a lower 
limit. 
[15] Witnesses-Examination of Adverse Party-Effect of Testi-
mony.-While testimony of witness called under Code Civ. 
Proc., § 2055, as an "adverse witness" is to be disregarded in-
sofar as unfavorable when considered on a motion for non-
suit or a directed verdict, such rule is not applicable when 
the case is submitted on its merits, in which case such testi-
mony is to receive the same consideration in determining the 
facts as any other testimony. 
[ 16] Automobiles-Instructions-Contributory Negligence-Guests. 
-While ordinarily a guest is not charged with the responsi-
bility of observing the condition of the traffic on highway, 
where the evidence in a vehicle collision case shows that 
plaintiff's guest did undertake to make such observation and 
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that she actively participated with plaintiff in their joint 
decision that the highway was "clear," it is proper to instruct 
the jury with reference to whether such guest exercised rea-
sonable care for her own safety. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the 
City and County of San Francisco and from an order denying 
a new trial. Edward .M:olkenbuhr, Judge. Judgment reversed; 
appeal from order dismissed. 
Action for damages for injuries resulting from an inter-
section collision of vehicles. Judgment for defendants re-
versed. 
Tobriner & Lazarus and Leland J. Lazarus for Appellants. 
Dion R. Holm, City Attorney, and George E. Eaglin, Dep-
uty City Attorney, for Respondents. 
SPENCE, J.-Plaintiffs sought to recover for personal in-
juries and property damage sustained as the result of an in-
tersection collision between an automobile driven by plaintiff 
Laura E. Daniels and a municipal bus operated by defendant 
Myron Urdahl. The verdict was for defendants. From the 
judgment thereupon entered and an order denying their mo-
tion for a new trial, plaintiffs have appealed. As the latter 
order is nonappealable (Code Civ. Proc., § 963; 20 Cal.Jur. 
213), the appeal therefrom must be dismissed. 
The jury was given the customary instructions on the 
issues of negligence and contributory negligence. However, 
the court refused to instruct on the doctrine of last clear 
chance. The propriety of such refusal is the principal point 
in dispute. The form of the proposed instruction is not in 
question. (B.A.,T.I. 205, p. 310; Root v. Pacific Greyhound 
Lines, 84 Cal.App.2d 135, 137 [190 P.2d 48) ; Alberding v. 
Pritchard, 97 Cal.App.2d 443, 444-445 [217 P .2d 1012].) 
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the ap-
plication of the doctrine and indulging every reasonable in-
ference in support thereof (Bonebrake v. McCormick, 35 Cal. 
2d 16, 19 [215 P.2d 728] ; Belinsky v. Olsen, 38 Cal.2d 102, 
103 [237 P.2d 645] ; Hopkins v. Carter, 109 Cal.App.2d 912, 
913 [241 P.2d 1063)), we have concluded that plaintiffs 
were entitled to the requested instruction. 
The accident occurred on March 5, 1949, about 5 :30 p. m. 
at the intersection of Alemany Boulevard and Congdon Street 
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in San Francisco. Alemany Boulevard, a six-lane signposted 
"through highway" (Veh. Code, §§ 82.5, 552, 577), runs in 
a general easterly-westerly direction. It is quite winding, 
and long concrete "islands" divide the boulevard into two 
three-lane roadways for opposite travel. Each roadway is 
38 feet wide, with the outer lane 17 feet 6 inches wide, the 
middle lane 10 feet wide, and the inner lane 10 feet 6 inches 
wide. Congdon Street runs north-south and slopes a little 
downhill as it ends at the boulevard. Mrs. Daniels was 
driving her automobile in a northerly direction along Congdon 
Street and approaching the boulevard intersection, which was 
protected by an arterial stop sign. She intended to cross 
the boulevard's eastbound lanes and turn to her left onto 
the westbound roadway. The view of eastbound boulevard 
traffic approaching from her left was partially obscured by 
a large billboard on the southwest corner of the intersection 
and the curving line of the boulevard. At that time de-
fendants' gasoline-propelled bus was traveling easterly in 
the boulevard's middle lane, having just made a stop at the 
Mission Street viaduct, which crosses the boulevard 750 feet 
west of Congdon Street. The driver, defendant Urdahl, then 
had a fleeting view of plaintiffs' automobile as it proceeded 
down Congdon Street and passed an opening between the 
corner billboard and the last house on the street. 
Meanwhile Mrs. Daniels drove slowly into the boulevard's 
eastbound roadway and when defendant Urdahl next saw it, 
it had stopped momentarily in the middle lane some 180 to 
200 feet in front of the bus. At that point Mrf'l. Daniels 
testified that she first saw the approaching bus, which she 
estimated to be traveling at a speed between 50 and 60 miles 
per hour. The bus driver testified to this sequence of events 
as he saw plaintiffs' automobile ahead on the boulevard: that 
he was then proceeding at the rate of 35 miles per hour ; 
that he immediately applied his brakes for about 30 or 40 
feet, slackening his speed to 15 or 20 miles an hour; that 
he then released the brakes, accelerated the bus and steered 
toward the inside lane in an effort to pass in front of plain-
tiffs' automobile; and that finally, when a collision seemed in-
evitable, he again applied his brakes. Mrs. Daniels testified 
that upon seeing the bus to the left bearing down on her as 
she was driving about 5 miles an hour, she accelerated her 
speed in an attempt to complete her crossing of the boule-
vard's eastbound roadway and avert a collision. However, 
the left front of the bus struck the left rear of her automo-
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bile just forward of its rear bumper, and spun it around so 
that it came to rest in the boulevard's three-lane roadway for 
westbound traffic. The last braking of the bus left 72 feet 
of skid marks to the point of collision, and there were 24 feet 
of "brush" marks made by the tires of plaintiffs' automo-
bile while it was being pushed along the pavement. Mrs. 
Daniels was thrown from her automobile by the impact and 
injured. Mrs. Smith, who was riding beside her, was less 
seriously hurt. 
[1] Whether or not the doctrine of last clear chance ap-
plies in a particular case depends entirely upon the existence 
or nonexistence of the elements necessary to bring it into 
play. Such question is controlled by factual circumstances 
and must ordinarily be resolved by the fact-finder. (Girdner 
v. Union Oil Co., 216 CaL 197, 199 [13 P.2d 915] ; Hopkins 
v. Cm·ter, supra, 109 Cal.App.2d 912, 915.) [2] An in-
struction stating the doctrine is proper when there is evi-
dence showing: " (1) 'fhat plaintiff has been negligent and, as 
a result thereof, is in a position of danger from which he 
cannot escape by the exercise of ordinary care; and this in-
cludes not only where it is physically impossible for him to 
escape, but also in cases where he is totally unaware of his 
danger and for that reason unable to escape; (2) that de-
fendant has knowledge that the plaintiff is in such a situa-
tion, and knows, or in the exercise of ordinary care should 
know, that plaintiff cannot escape from such situation; and 
( 3) has the last clear chance to avoid the accident by exer-
cising ordinary care, and fails to exercise the same, and the 
accident results thereby, and plaintiff is injured as the proxi-
mate result of such failure." (Girdner v. Union Oil Co., 
supra, p. 202; also Belinsky v. Olsen, supra, 38 Cal.2d 102, 
104; Peterson v. Burkhalter, 38 Ca1.2d 107, 109-110 [237 P.2d 
977].) 
[3a] The first clement is not lacking under the evidence-
that plaintiff Laura Daniels by reason of her own negligence 
found herself in a position of danger from which she could 
not escape by the exercise of ordinary care. While there is 
a conflict as to whether· plaintiffs' automobile stopped at the 
arterial stop sign before entering the boulevard, the defense 
witnesses agreed that Mrs. Daniels did not make the required 
stop but merely "slowed down" her automobile as she ap-
proached the intersection, and that she came to a complete 
stop only as she was crossing the boulevard's middle lane 
for !:)a8tbound traffic. At that point she first became aware 
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of defendants' bus as it was traveling toward her in the 
center eastbound lane, and it was then that she accelerated 
her automobile in an effort to escape from its path. 
Nor is the evidence lacking· in support of the second 
element, upon defendants' claim that there is no showing 
that Urdahl, the bus driver, was aware of Mrs. Daniels' per-
ilous situation or knew that she could not escape therefrom. 
Urdahl testified that he first saw plaintiffs' automobile in the 
brief interval when it passed between the corner billboard 
and the last house on Congdon Street, and next when it pro-
ceeded into the boulevard. He kept his eyes on it and saw 
it "slowing up" until it came to a complete stop directly in 
his path in the boulevard's center lane. [4] He could not then 
know what was the cause for the retardation of plaintiffs' 
automobile as it rolled slowly into his lane of travel, and 
whether or not such procedure was sufficient to alert a rea-
sonable man was a factual consideration for the jury. [5] As 
stated in Cady v. Sanford, 57 Cal.App. 218, 226 [207 P. 45] : 
"It was not necessary that appellant should actually know 
that an accident was inevitable if he failed to exercise care. 
It is enough if the circumstances of which he had knowledge 
were such as to convey to the mind of a reasonably prudent 
man a question as to whether respondent would be able to 
escape a collision.'' (Peterson v. Burkhalter, sttpra, 38 Cal. 
2d 107, 111; see, also, Jones v. Yuma Motor F. Terminal Co., 
45 Cal.App.2d 497, 501-502 [114 P.2d 438]; Alberding v. 
Pritchard, supra, 97 Cal.App.2d 443, 445.) 
[6] Defendants argue that plaintiffs' automobile was not 
in a "position of danger" until it "jumped forward" from 
a standing position in the middle lane into the path of the 
bus as Urdahl veered to the inside lane in an attempt to 
avoid a collision. But such argument makes no allowance 
for Urdahl 's admitted awareness of plaintiffs' automobile be-
fore it even stopped and while he saw it reducing its speed 
as it came into his path. From this aspect of the evidence it 
becomes unnecessary to consider decisions upon which de-
fendants rely to the effect that the last clear chance doctrine 
cannot apply until a position from which the plaintiff can-
not escape danger has been reached. ( Yottng v. Southern Pac. 
Co., 189 Cal. 746, 753 [210 P. 259] ; Rodabattgh v. Tekus, 39 
Cal.2d 290, 294 [246 P.2d 663].) It would be a disregard 
of the realities of the situation to hold that under no view 
of the record could it be said that Urdahl 's obsPrvation of 
the slackening speed of plaintiffs' automobile until it finally 
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came to rest in his lane of travel on the 55-mile per hour high-
way might not reasonably constitute sufficient warning of the 
imminently perilous position created in front of him. Such 
consideration distinguishes cases where there was no evi-
dence that would sustain a finding of knowledge by de-
fendant of the plaintiff's dang·er. (Johnson v. Southwestern 
Eng. Co., 41 Cal.App.2d 623, 628 [107 P.2d 417] .) 
Likewise the recol'cl is not lacking in support of the 
third dement of ihe doctrine bearing on Urdahl's possession 
of the last clear ehaw~e to avoid the collision through the exer-
l:ise of onlinary care. Both Mrs. Daniels and Mrs. Smith 
tesrified that when they first savY defendants' bus approaching 
in tl1e boulevard's middle lane, it was about 200 feet to their 
left. :Mrs. Daniels estimated its speed at between 50 and 60 
miles per hour. Unlahl trstified that he was then traveling 
about 35 miles per hour an(] that he saw plaintiffs' automobile 
at the stated distaHec in front of him "slowing down" to a 
"eomplete stop," at ,;,·hieh i ime he gave his bus 30 or 40 feet 
of ''pretty heavy ... braking'' so as to reduce his speed 
to about 15 or 20 mil''" prr hour. Then he put his foot on 
the gas throttle aml wl1en plaintiffs' automobile was still some 
50 feet distant, l1e turned his bus toward the inner lane in 
an effort to pas.~ in frollt of it but instead its left rear end was 
caught by the btu;. Defendants argue that Mrs. Daniels ad-
mittedly entering into the boulevard at the slow rate of 5 
miles per hour, rather than Urdahl driving the rapidly moving 
bus, had the better chanee to avoid the accident; that traveling 
at Pi miles per hour, she estimated that she could have stopped 
within one foot, so that until she reached that distance from 
the projected path of the bus she was only "approaching but 
.. not aetnally in a position of danger" (Dalley v. Williams, 
78 Cal.App.2d 427, 435 [166 P.2d 595]); that having come 
to a stop in the boulevard's middle lane, she could have re-
mained there in a "place of safety" until defendants' bus 
passe(] in front of lJPr automobile via the inner lane (Gore v. 
iJ1arket Street Ry. 4 Cal.2c1154, 157 [48 P.2d 2]); or she 
could have accelerated the speed of her automobile sufficiently 
to have cleared the path of the bus instead of being hit at the 
left rear bumper ( cf. Young v. Southern Pac. Co., 182 Cal. 
369, 380 [190 P. 36] ). Defendants further argue that having 
come to a Mrs. Daniels, to all appearances, was yielding 
the right of way to Urdahl and inviting him to swing to the 
left or inner lane in front of her; and that as he accordingly 
changed his course, he could not anticipate that she would 
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fJreate a second emergency by "jumping" her automobile 
ahead into the inner lane, when it was not possible for the 
bus to stop in time to avoid a collision. ( Ginwno v. Martin, 64 
Cal.App. 154, 157 [220 P. 1076] .) To this point defendants 
cite Vehicle Code, section 543, which provides: "No person 
shall start a vehicle stopped ... on a highway ... unless 
and until such movement can be made with reasonable.,;afety." 
Plaintiffs, on the other hand, contend that their automobile was 
not in a "place of safety" standing in the boulevard's middle 
lane with defendants' bus 200 feet to the left and continuing 
to travel directly ahead toward plaintiffs' automobile without 
deviation ; that Urdahl 's partial braking so as to reduce the 
speed of the bns to 15 or 20 miles per hour might reasonably 
be construed as an invitation for Mrs. Daniels to accelerate 
her automobile forward and escape from the perilous position 
in the center lane, and that without warning or signal of 
any kind to indicate his intent to change his course, Urdahl 
stepped on the accelerator of the bus to swing into the inner 
lane as plaintiffs' automobile was but 50 feet ahead, and the 
two vehicles collided. 
[7] In the light of these opposing factual considerations, 
it was for the jury to determine whether Urdahl had a last 
clear chance to avoid the accident by exercising ordinary 
care. (Root v. Pac1:jic Greyhonnd Lines, s1~pra, 84 Cal.App.2d 
135, 137; Bragg v. Smith, 87 Cal.App.2d 11, 14 [195 P.2d 
546 J ; Hopkins v. Carter, supm, 109 Cal.App.2d 912, 916.) 
There is no shovving in the record that the operation of either 
vehicle was hindered by the presence of other automobiles in 
the innnediate vicinity. The fact that it could be inferred 
from the evidence that Urdahl should have foreseen that Mrs. 
Daniels might proceed forward in response to his slowing 
down his bus in the middle lane distinguishes such cases as 
JYicHt~gh v. Market St. Ry. Co., 29 Cal.App.2d 737 [85 P.2d 
467], and Jones v. Het·nr·ieh, 49 Cal.App.2d 702 [122 P.2d 
804], relied on by defendants. Likewise not in point are cases 
involving collisions between two fast-moving vehicles at a 
street intersection (Poneino v. Reid-Mtwdock & Co., 136 Cal. 
App. 228, 232 [28 P.2d 932] ; Dalley v. Williams, supra, 73 
Cal.App.2d 427, 436; Allin v. Snavely, 100 Cal.App.2d 411, 
415 [224 P.2d 113]) or between a fast-moving vehicle and a 
train at a railroad crossing (Johnson v. Sacramento Northern 
Ry., 54 Cal.App.2d 528, 532 [129 P.2d 503]) where the act 
creating the peril occurs practically simultaneously with the 
happening of the accident and in which neither party may be 
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said to have had thereafter a last clear chance to avoid the 
consequences. (Rodabaugh v. Tektcs, supra, 39 Cal.2d 290, 
294-295.) The relative time, speed and distance factors in 
the cases where the evidence was held insufficient as a matter 
of law to permit the application of the doctrine were quite 
rtifferent from those before us. 
[3c] As the present record has been here reviewed, it 
cannot be said as a matter of law that the evidence was in-
sufficient to justify the application of the last clear chance 
doetrine. Defendants submit that even though the court 
erroneonflly refused to instruct on the last clear chance doc-
trine, nevertheless no prej ndice resulted to plaintiffs because 
( 1) the doctrine was covered by other. instructions given by 
the eonrt and (2) the general verdict of the jury imports 
fimlings in favor of defendants on all material issues so as to 
preelude plaintiffs from raising an objection based on that 
theory of recovery. Neither point is well taken. 
[8] The instructions cited by defendants in nowise pur-
porter] to include the elements of the last clear chance doc-
trine. Rather they were directed only to the duty of the 
bus drivrr to "use reasonable prudence in analyzing the ... 
situation'' confronting him so as to avoid colliding with plain-
tiffs' automobile. [9] Moreover, the court in its other in-
structions plainly refuied any application of the last clear 
ehance doctrine by charging the jury that any negligence 
on the part of either Mrs. Daniels or her guest, Mrs. Smith, 
would bar a recovery, thoug·h a necessary tenet of the doctrine 
is the presence of the plaintiff's negligence. (Girdner v. Union 
Oil Co., supra, 216 Cal. 197, 201-204; Belinsky v. Olsen, supra, 
38 Cal.2d 102, 105.) [10] It is the duty of the court to 
instruct on every theory of the case finding support in the 
evidence. (Emery v. Los Angeles Ry. Corp., 61 Cal.App.2d 
455, 462-463 [143 P.2c1112]; Ji'e1·rnla v. Santa Fe Bus Lines, 
83 CaLL\pp.2(1 416, 420 [189 P.2d 294]; Stickel v. Durfee, 88 
Cal.App.2d 402, 406-407 [199 P.2d 16].) [11] The ordi-
nar;· rules on appeal sustaining a general verdict which the 
evidence on one of several issues upholds (2 CaLJur., § 612, 
pp. 1028-1029; 24 CaLTur., § 134, p. 885) has no application 
here where plaintiffs' theory of recovery was not even pre-
sented to the jury as an issue affecting their right of recovery. 
(Bonebrake v. McCormick, supra., 35 Cal 16, 19; Belinsky 
v. Olsen, supra, 38 Ca1.2d 102, 103.) [12] In determining, 
from a consideration of the entire record, whether the error 
prejudiced. plaintiffs' rights (Canst., art. VI, § 4lj2 ), the rule 
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is no different from that applicable in a criminal case and 
stated as follows : ''If it cannot be said that, in the absence 
of the error complained of, a different verdict would have been 
improbable, the erroneous ruling constitutes a miscarriage of 
justice within the meaning of the constitutional provision.'' 
(People v. Newson, 37 Cal.2d 34, 45 [230 P.2d 618]; see, also, 
People v. Hamilton, 33 Cal.2d 45, 51 [198 P.2d 873] .) It so 
apppars here. 
Certain other points raised by plaintiffs with regard to the 
instructions will be briefly discussed. 
[13] The first point is plaintiffs' attack upon the court's 
charge that as a matter of law the prima facie speed limit 
for defendants at the intersection in question was 55 miles per 
hour, and that accordingly Mrs. Daniels, upon driving into 
the boulevard, should exercise an amount of care commensurate 
with such travel conditions. Plaintiffs argue that the jury 
was thereby misinformed as to the authorized prima facie 
speed limit and that whether the area was a residence dis-
trict vvith a 25-mile limit (Veh. Code. § 511) "would be a jury 
question and not one for judicial notice.'' But the sign posting 
of a highway is absolutely essential for the application of 
the lower prima facie speed limits. Section 511, after except-
ing certain types of areas where lower speed limits apply, ex-
pressly prescribes a 55-mile limit "under all conditions 
unless a different speed is established as provided in this 
code ancl signs aTe 1:n place g1:ving notice thereof." (Emphasis 
added.) Accordingly, ''no area has the prima facie speed 
limit of a ... residence district unless it is sign posted.'' 
(Reynolds v. Pilomeo, 38 Cal.2d 5, 13 [236 P.2d 801] ; 
GueTTa v. BTooks, 38 Cal.2d16, 19-20 [236 P.2d 807] .) [14] A 
witness for defendants testified that a 25-mile sign was posted 
for westbound Alemany traffic "right at the edge of the via-
duct,'' which was ''about two or three blocks'' west of the 
intersection, and that while not sure, he did not believe that 
in the area in question there were any speed limit signs posted 
for eastbound boulevard traffic. No other evidence was 
addneed 'Nith regard to reduced speed limits under applicable 
signs. Defendants introduced in evidence diagrams showing 
that the boulevard lacked the requisite dwelling-house density 
for a "residence district." (Veh. Code, §§ 90, 90.1.) Mani-
festly, the mentioned 25-milc sign "rig'ht at the edge of the 
viaduct'' directed to westbound traffic marked the entrance of 
boulevard traffic into a business or residence district extending 
to the west thereof and had no relevancy to speed for travel 
Apr. 1953] DANIELS v. CITY & CouNTY cw SAN J1--,RANcrsco 625 
[40 C.2d 614; 255 P.2d 785] 
eastward of it on either side of the boulevard. In such state 
of the record the court did not err in giving the challenged 
instruction. 
[15] The seeond point is plaintiffs' eontention that the 
eourt gave an erroneous and misleading instruetion on the 
effect of seetion 2055, Code of Civil Procedure. Defendant 
Urdahl was ealled by plaintiffs as an ''adverse witness'' and 
questioned at some length. In this regard the eourt eharged: 
''I instruet you that testimony given under seetion 2055 
... is just as mueh evidenee in the ease as any other testi-
mony properly reeeived. Sueh testimony is to reeeive the 
same eonsideration from the jury in determining the facts 
as any other testimony. Sueh testimony, if believed by the 
jury and if otherwise suffieient, will sustain a verdiet against 
the plaintiffs in this ease.'' Plaintiffs maintain that ''the 
instruction should have explained that any sueh testimony 
elieited by the plaintiffs should weigh for them insofar as 
it was favorable, but that it should be disregarded insofar 
as it was ttnfavorable, if the matters to which it referred were 
not satisfaetorily established by other evidenee." (Emphasis 
added.) But plaintiffs are relying upon authorities involving 
rulings upon a motion either for a nonsuit (Marchetti v. 
Southern Pac. Co., 204 Cal. 679, 686 [269 P. 529]; Dempsey 
v. Star House Movers, Inc., 2 Cal.App.2d 720, 722 [38 P.2d 
825]) or for a dirceted verdict (Smellie v. Sottthent Pac. Co., 
212 Cal. 540, 556 [299 P. 529]; People v. Mahoney, 13 Cal. 
2d 729, 736 [91 P.2d 10291 ). 'l'he rules therein stated have 
no application upon submission of the ease for a determina-
tion of the factual issues on the merits. (F'igari v. Olcese, 
184 Cal. 775, 782 [195 P. 425, 15 A.L.R. 192]; Darn v. 
P1"chinino, 105 Cal.App.2d 796, 800 [234 P.2d 307].) Thr 
distinction is noted in the Smellie case, where, after a full 
discussion, it is stated that testimony elicited under section 
2055 ''is, of course, evidence in the case and may be con-
sidered in determining the issues of the case upon the trial 
or final hearing by the court. or if the case is before a jury, 
by the jury." (212 Cal. 559; see, also, Green v. Newmark, 
136 Cal.App. 32, 37-38 [28 P.2d 395]; Balasco v. Chick, 84 
Cal.App.2d 802, 808 [192 P.2d 76].) Since this case was 
submitted to the jury on. the merits, the assailed instruction 
was proper. (Joseph v. Vogt, 35 Cal.App.2d 439, 441 r95 P.2d 
947]; Cloud v. Market Street Ry. Co., 74 Cal.App.2d 92, 96 
[168 P.2d 191].) 
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[16] The final point is plaintiffs' contention that since 
there "was not the slightest evidence ... upon which to base 
a finding of contributory negligence on the part of [plaintiffl 
Kathaleen Smith,'' the instruction submitting that issue as 
to her was contrary to both the law and the evidence. They 
cite as particularly objectionable the following charge: "If 
you find that the plaintiff Kathaleen Smith did not look care-
fully for traffic eastbound on Alemany Boulevard, and that 
she told JVIrs. Daniels that Alemany Boulevard looked clear 
when in fact the bus was approaching so closely as to con-
stitute an innm•diate hazard, the plaintiff Kathaleen Smith 
was in such case guilty of negligence.'' But the quoted instruc-
tion does not appear to have been improper in view of the 
record. 
As the guest of lVIrs. Daniels, lVIrs. Smith could only be 
chargeable with negligence by reason of her own conduct 
rather than that of JVIrs. Daniels. lVIrs. Smith testified that 
as plaintiffs' automobile came to a stop at the boulevard 
intersection, she "glanced both ways" for traffic, that she 
"saw nothing coming," and that she agr~ed with Mrs. Daniels 
when the latter said that ''it all looked clear and we might 
just as well go across." The record also shows that at the 
intersection a billboard obstructed the view looking to the 
left down the boulevard for eastbound traffic, so that de-
fendants' bus did not come into the range of vision of Mrs. 
Daniels and Mrs. Smith until after the former started to 
drive acros!S the boulevard. While ordinarily ''a guest'' 
is "not charged with the responsibility for observing 
the condition of the traffic upon the highway" (Murphy v. 
National Ice Crearn Co., 114 Cal.App. 482, 489 [300 P. 91]; 
see, also, 1~1artinelli v. Poley, 210 Cal. 450, 458 [292 P. 451]), 
plaintiffs' evidence here shows that Mrs. Smith did undertake 
to make such observation and that she actively participated 
with Mrs. Daniels in their joint decision that the boulevard 
"wa;;; clear." ·under these circumstances the quoted instruc-
tion properly stated considerations affecting the jury's de-
termination of whether Mrs. Smith exercised "reasonable care 
for rher] own safety." (Miller v. Peter·s, 37 Cal.2d 89, 94 
[230 P.2d 803] .) 
In view of the above discussion relative to the applicability 
of the last clear chance doctrine in the determination of this 
case and the court's refusal to instruct thereon, plaintiffs are 
entitled to a retrial. 
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'l'he appeal from the order denying the motion for a J1(n\ 
trial is dismissed. The judgment iR reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, ,J., and 1'raynor, J., concurred. 
Edmonds, ,J ., dissented. 
OAR1'ER, J .-I concur in the judgment of reversal because 
I think it is obvious that reasonable minds might differ on 
whether or not defendant had a last clear chance to avoid 
the accident here involved. This is the one and only test 
which may be applied in determining whether a case comes 
within the last clear chance doctrine. There was a con-
flict in the evidence and the trier of fact might well have 
found that plaintiff Daniels was negligent in placing herself 
and Mrs. Smith in a position of peril which was perceived 
by defendant in time to avoid a collision if he had exercised 
ordinary care; that plaintiff was unable, by the exercise of 
ordinary care, to extricate herself and Mrs. Smith from such 
peril; and that defendant's failure to exercise ordinary care 
was therefore the proximate cause of the accident. 'l'he facts 
as disclosed by the record justify but do not compel this 
conclusion. 
The last clear chance doctrine has been applied in numerous 
cases by the courts of this state. .As a legal theory it is well 
understood by the legal profession. It is in the application 
of the doctrine to a particular case where conflicts arise. (See 
excellent article by Myron L. Garon, member of Los .Angeles 
Bar, entitled Recent Developments in California's Last Clear 
Chance Doctrine, volume 40, Cal.L.Rev., pp. 40"1-411.) There 
ean be no doubt that the doctrine has been manna for injured 
plaintiffs who have themselves been negligent. In my opinion 
it is a salutary doctrine evolved by great liberal-minded 
jurists to ameliorate the injustice whieh resulted from a rigid 
application of the plea of contributory negligence as a eom-
plete defense in an aetion for personal injuries. I.1ike a11 
other liberal doctrines it has met with opposition. Those 
opposed have generally rejected it as inapplicable to the fac-
tual situation presented in a particular case-holding the 
doetrine inapplicable as a matter of law. 'l'his eonclusion 
being reached regardless of whether reasonable minds might 
differ as to the factual situation presented. Such cases as 
Yonng v. Smdhern Pac. Co., 182 Cal. 369 [190 P. 36]; Roda-
battgh v. Tektts, 39 Cal.2d 290 [246 P.2d 663] ; Johnson v. 
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Southwestern Eng. Co., 41 Cal.App.2d 623 [107 P.2d 417]; 
Dalley Y. Williams, 73 Cal.App.2d 427 [166 P.2d 595] ; Gore 
Y. klarket Street Ry. Co., 4 Cal.2d 154 [ 48 P.2d 2] ; and 
Johnson v. Sacramento Northcr·n Ry., 54 Cal.App.2d 528 [129 
P.2d 503] fall in this category. 
There are, of course, many cases in which the doctrine is 
inapplicable. There are also borderline cases. The problem 
is first for the trial court to determine. If it submits the 
issue to the jury on proper instructions and the jury finds 
liability, I do not think it can then be said that reasonable 
minds cannot differ as to the applicability of the doctrine, 
because, to so hold, is to say that the trial judge and members 
of the jury do not have reasonable minds. If the trial judge 
refuses to submit the issue to the jury, the same situation 
arises as when a nonsuit, directed verdict or motion for judg-
ment notwithstanding the verdict is granted. The question for 
the appellate court to determine in such a case is whether 
there was any substantial evidence in the record on which a 
trier of fact could reach a contrary conclusion. Of course, 
if the appellate court holds that such evidence exists, the 
reasonable minds doctrine comes into play and the case goes 
back to the trial court where the issues of fact are determined. 
'fhis is and should be the law, because it is the product of 
reason, logic and common sense. If it were applied by the 
courts of this state, it would remove a tremendous burden 
from this court and the District Courts of Appeal as well 
as our superior courts. 'fhis is manifest when we consider 
that many of the cases now before this court and the District 
Courts of Appeal involve only factual questions which have 
been determined by the trial courts and the question we are 
asked to decide is whether the issues of fact were correctly 
determined. 'fhis is not the function of this court or of the 
District Courts of Appeal, and if the members of this court 
would come to this realization, we would have more time to 
consider questions of law and dispose of cases more expedi-
tiously. To demonstrate the truth of the foregoing statement, 
I wish to call attention to the fact that we now have twelve 
cases pending before this court which involve only factual 
questions. Most of these cases, including the case at bar, were 
correctly decided by the District Court of Appeal (see Daniels 
v. C1:ty & County of San Francisco, *(Cal.App.) 246 P.2d 
125, but these cases are before this court because a hearing 
-• A hearing was granted by the Supreme Court on Sept. 11, 1952. 
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was granted for the sole purpose of reconsidering questions 
of fact. I shall have more to say on this subject when the 
decisions in these cases are announced. 
I also disagree with that part of the majority opinion 
which holds that the trial court properly submitted to the 
jury the issue of contributory negligence on the part of 
Kathaleen Smith. The uncontradicted evidence shows that 
Mrs. Smith was a guest in defendant Daniels' automobile, 
had no control over its operation and there is no basis what-
soever for an inference that any negligence on her part in 
anywise contributed to the accident. In this respect I am in 
full accord with the views expressed by the District Court of 
Appeal in its decision, supra, on this subject. 
SCHAUER, ,T., Dissenting.-! would affirm the judgment. 
Here again, in my opinion, is a case in which application 
of the last clear chance doctrine has been extended past 
reasonable bounds and the doctrine has become not one of 
last clear chance but one of last possible chance. (See Peter-
son v. Bur·khalter (1951), 38 Cal.2d 107 [237 P.2d 977], and 
my dissent at page 114; Rodabaugh v. Tekus (1952), 39 Cal. 
2d 290 [246 P.2d 668], and my concurrence at page 297.) 
Viewing the evidence most favorable to the application 
of the last clear chance doctrine, there is here a plaintiff 
who, having negligently placed herself in a position of peril 
(she disregarded the defendants' arterial right of way, drove 
at 5 miles an hour into the path of the bus, stopped, and 
then started up again, slovvly), endeavors to escape therefrom 
and a defendant who is charged with negligence in failing to 
anticipate correctly, within a matter of seconds or fractions 
of seconds, what course plaintiff will take in the endeavor 
to escape the position of peril. Plaintiff was driving a rela-
tively light and maneuverable automobile; defendant driver 
was operating a heavy and unwieldy bus. If plaintiff had 
either remained standing in the middle lane or had started her 
slow progress forward from such middle lane to the inner lane, 
then at once halted, and the bus had followed the course which 
it actually did follow, the collision would have been avoided. 
If plaintiff had progressed a little more rapidly the collision 
would have been avoided. If the bus driver had. elected to 
take the o11ter lane the collision would have been avoided. To 
state that the bus driver, required to make such rapid 
and nice anticipations of plaintiff'R possiblr conduct and 
such nice calculations of what his own conduct should be, 
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and to translate his conduct into control of the heavy and 
rapidly moving bus, had a clear chance to avoid the accident 
is, in my opinion, unrealistic and inaccurate. Where, as here, 
plaintiff has at least as much chance to avoid a collision as 
does defendant, I find no field for application of the last clear 
chance doctrine. 
Decisions of this kind suggest a need for legislative study 
of the several facets of the problems involved. In this state, 
what is the annual toll of, and loss from, traffic accidents not 
indnstrially incurred? Can our society devise a better method 
for protecting or compensating the injured and their families 
than the common law tort action? If so, who should bear 
the primary burden of such protection? How far should it 
be spread'? And in what forum enforced? 
rrhe above are but queries for future solution. The judg-
ment here, on the present recognized concepts of law, should 
be affirmed. 
Respondents' petition for a rehearing was denied May 7, 
1953. Edmonds. J., and Schauer, J., were of the opinion 
that the petition should be granted. 
[L. A. No. 22524. In Bank. Apr. 9, 1953.] 
·ALBERT J. SILLS, Appellant, v. LOS ANGELES 
TRANSIT LINES (a Corporation) et al., Respondents. 
[1] Trial-Instructions-Theory of Case.-Each party is entitled 
to have his theory of the case submitted to the jury in accord-
ance with the pleadings and proof, and it is incumbent on 
the trial court to instruct on all vital issues involved. 
[2] Street Railways-Injuries from Operation-Questions of Law 
and Fact.-Where plaintiff suing for injuries sustained as 
result of collision of his automobile and defendant's streetcar 
testified that the streetcar was four blocks away as he stopped 
on the track and remained there 25 to 30 seconds prior to 
[1] See Cal.Jur., Trial, § 92; Am.Jur., Trial, § 626. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Trial, § 154; [2] Street Railways, 
§107(1); [3] Negligence, §29; [4] Street Railways, §107(5); 
[5] Street Railways, § 107(7); [6] Negligence, § 48(3); [7] Street 
Railways, § 102(8); [8, 9] Negligence, § 218; [10] Street Rail-
ways, § 127(8). 
